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Abstract
We consider a model of law enforcement where homogenous,
risk neutral, and corruptible inspectors are responsible for mon-
itoring rms adoption of pollution prevention technology. A
welfare maximizing government can implement appropriate wage
policies to prevent collusion, but we nd that governments char-
acterized by high administrative costs in administrating nes, or
by a low ability to spot and prosecute corruption, may prefer
to let corruption happen. By allowing rms to purchase pollu-
tion permits in lieu of the technology, the government is able to
increase welfare by reducing red tape, keeping a leaner monitor-
ing force, and eliminating rents to its force. The use of permits
further benets society by allowing the country to fully elimi-
nate corruption. This theory can be applied in a variety of law
enforcement situations.
1 Introduction
The literature on law enforcement has long noted the widespread pres-
ence of self-reporting of criminal acts, or the admission of culpability
by a law breaker prior of being caught by a law enforcer. In practice,
o¤enders choose to admit their misdeeds when they are certain the gov-
ernment will be lenient to them: they are better o¤ paying a reduced
ne for certain than facing the chance of getting caught and su¤er a
harsh sentence. The theory behind self reporting in law enforcement has
already been explored by Malik (1993) and Kaplow and Shavell (1994)
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(henceforth KS)1; using a model à la Becker (1964) they demonstrate
that law enforcement with self reporting is more e¢ cient than law en-
forcement without it.
We take the model of KS as a point of departure into another issue
that is of key interest in the literature of law enforcement: the possibility
that law o¢ cers may accept bribes from those who they are supposed
to apprehend. In practice, what we mean by corruption is a process in
which an individual who is apprehended by a police o¢ cer for having
committed an unlawful act pays the o¢ cer a bribe. This bribe guaran-
tees that the o¢ cer would not report the individual to the judiciary2.
When we expand the basic setup introduced by KS to account for side
payments between o¢ cer and o¤ender, we demonstrate that self report-
ing can reduce the costs incurred in the ght against corruption, and
therefore, make this ght cheap enough to be always worthwhile. In
particular, our model identies three benets of self reporting, which
translate into savings in law enforcement expenditures. The rst source
of savings derives from the need to hire fewer law enforcement o¢ cials
when criminals self report, precisely the point made by KS. When self-
reporting is e¤ective, o¤enders prefer to use it, and since crimes are
solved without the aid of investigations, fewer law o¢ cials are needed
to monitor the population of innocent civilians. A second advantage
of self reporting may come from a reduction of judicial expenditures:
it is cheaper to prosecute self-reported crimes than equivalent crimes
which were not self reported, since guilt is already established without
the need to thorough investigation and litigation. Finally, and most im-
portantly for our paper, self-reporting reduces the actual rents paid to
law o¢ cers in order to keep them honest. Without self-reporting, of-
cers must be induced to refuse bribes that are o¤ered to them. The
government achieves this by providing bonuses to o¢ cers who indeed
report o¤enders to the judiciary system. In order for the bonuses to be
e¤ective, they must be of a higher value than whatever bribe an o¤ender
is willing to o¤er; a bidding war ensures that rents to o¢ cials are high.
Self-reporting provides an alternative strategy to the o¤ender, who now
can simply avoid paying the bribe or the full ne by paying directly to
the government. When the individual chooses this alternative, he avoids
entirely the confrontation with the law o¢ cer, who cannot claim either
bribe or bonus. Clearly, this mechanism also eliminates bribes, since it
eliminates the possibility of bribe exchange.
1See also Polinsky and Shavell (2000) for a more general discussion on the theory
behind law enforcement.
2Polinsky and Shavell (2001) also consider corruption in law enforcement which
include the possibility for extortion of innocent civilians.
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An important issue that we consider in our analysis is that bribery,
because costly to the o¤ender, in itself helps enforcing the law and may
therefore be desirable: by providing an alternative ne that competes
with the o¢ cial sanction, it discourages committing unlawful acts. Be-
cause of that, certain governments may in fact prefer an enforcement
system based on bribe exchanges than one based on legal nes (Besley
and McClaren 1993)3. This preference may arise when legal enforcement
is too costly relative to corruptenforcement. The introduction of self
reporting may change the preferences of the government by reducing the
cost of legal enforcement, and therefore may be used to clean up the
entire system.
Our theory has important implications for the practice of law en-
forcement when the enforcers are corrupt. Enforcement agencies which
su¤er from widespread corruption within the ranks are fairly common
in many countries of the world, one reason being that cleansing it would
be at once painful and expensive. Our paper suggests that when reform
is implemented in conjunction with self-reporting, some of the costs of
reform can be eliminated. We temper this statement by immediately
suggesting caveats: this result is true under the strict assumptions of
the model, and indeed may fail under some other assumptions; in the
later portion of the paper, we explain where the limits to the applicability
of the theory lie. We clearly cannot span all desirable modeling choices
here, and we hope that our contribution will bring forth more research
in the area of self-reporting, law enforcement, and moral hazard4.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
baseline model. Section 3 introduces the possibility of extortion. Section
4 notes important limitations of the theory. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Structure
There is a measure 1 of risk-neutral citizens who can commit an unlawful
act or crime that causes a harm to society of h. Each citizen derives a
private gain x from committing the act, which is distributed with a
continuous density function g(:) and cumulative distribution function
3While bribery discourages unlawful acts, it is true that it is not necessarily an
e¤ective deterrent when compared with a system based on nes (Becker and Stigler,
1974; Polinsky and Shavell 2001)
4A di¤erent issue is the e¤ect of self-reporting, or leniency programs, in deter-
ring long term illegal relationships (Motta and Polo, 2003) by creating a prisoners
dilemma. In this regard, Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2005) show that leniency pro-
grams could help sustaining occasional sequential illegal transactions by solving the
hold-up problem.
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G(:). Clearly, society faces a social loss whenever an act is committed
by a person whose private gain is x < h. To minimize the number of
crimes the government employs a police force responsible to monitor the
population and report violators to a court of law, which in turn imposes
nes to the violators.
In the absence of any other consideration, citizens choose to commit
the unlawful act only when their private benet exceeds the expected
sanction. In equilibrium, enforcement determines a threshold level of
gain x^ such that only individuals whose private benet exceeds x^ commit
the act. The harm to society due to criminality will then be
[1 G(x^)]h
2.1.1 The police force and Corruption
Monitoring by the police force is not costless; the government employs a
force of p o¢ cers, and must pay wages w > w, where wis the o¢ cers
reservation wage. O¢ cers are risk neutral individuals who are potentially
corruptible, meaning that they will consider accepting bribes. They are
also credit constrained: the base pay that they can receive cannot fall
below their reservation wage5.
Each o¢ cer visits one randomly chosen individual, whereupon she
learns whether the person is an o¤ender. When an o¤ense is uncovered,
the o¢ cer can report the violation to the judiciary system, which levies
a ne f to the o¤ender. Alternatively, the o¤ender may agree to pay a
bribe b to the o¢ cer in exchange for her silence. We assume that when
the value of the bribe is less than a certain fraction of the ne f; where
 2 [0; 1], such bribe goes undetected or, if detected, unprosecuted6. If a
bribe is larger than f , then the collusion is uncovered, the o¢ cer loses
his wage, and the o¤ender is made to pay the full ne f . Because of
this, o¢ cers are willing to consider bribes
b  f
The parameter  plays an important role in the comparative statics
of the model. We think of  as a parsimonious description of how easy it
is to detect collusion. The case where  is small or zero corresponds to
transparent societies where even small bribes are not tolerated; a high
5This assumption is not necessary for some of our results to hold, as we discuss
in section 5. Nonetheless, it is a reasonable assumption when wages are understood
in a more general sense to include per o¢ cer costs, which include expenditures on
equipment (cars, computers, weapons) that cannot be skimped over.
6It is often said that bribe-takers can avoid being punished when a superior or
auditor detects the bribe by bribing the superior who himself may be corruptible
(Cadot 1987, Andvig and Moene 1990)
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 instead corresponds to potentially more corrupt societies, where even
outrageous instances of bribery are not prosecuted. With this parameter,
we want to distinguish between countries where, be them developed or
underdeveloped, it is unthinkable to give even small bribes to o¢ cials,
and other countries where bribery is acceptable7.
Aside from this exogenously given detection function, the government
has no other sticks to prevent corruption. The only anti-corruption
measure would be a carrot: the payment of incentives i that are con-
ditional on the report submitted by the o¢ cer. Because acceptance of
the bribe implies foregoing the incentive, the inspector will consider only
bribes that have the following characteristic:
b  i
Finally, consider the choices available to an o¤ender: if he is caught,
he will prefer the payment of the bribe when such payment is less than
the ne:
b  f
The agreement on the bribe is reached through Nash bargaining, with
weights of . Equilibrium bribe then is
b = min [f; (1  )i+ f ] (1)
This bribe has similar characteristics to other found in the literature
(..........): it increases with the size of the incentive, and decreases with
the likelihood of detection, . To fully eliminate corruption, the gov-
ernment must set incentives high enough according to the no-collusion
condition:
inc  f (2)
In this simple model with homogeneous inspectors, there are only
extreme outcomes. when i < inc, all inspectors accept bribes, and all
law o¤enders o¤er them. Since reports of o¤enders are never led, the
7It is common in the literature on corruption to assume that the probability
of detecting bribe exchanges is a choice variable of the government. We abstract
from it in order to keep the model simple. For an analysis of endogenous bribe
detection, see Mookherjee and Png (1995), Polinsky and Shavell (2001). In Adving
and Moene (1990), the probability of detection depends by how corrupt the overall
system is. Overlapping responsibilities among di¤erent bureaucrats may also increase
the chances of detection and the size of bribes, since o¢ cials may need to solve a
coordination game (Rose-Ackerman 1994). See Bhardan (1997) for an insightful
review.
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government neither pays incentives, nor levies nes. When i  inc, no
bribes are ever exchanged, and therefore all violations are reported, all
nes are levied, and all incentives are paid. We label these two events
by the index j 2 fc; ncg.
2.1.2 Government Expenditures
Government expenditures consist of wage payments net of revenues from
nes collected and is dened by Bj when in state j. Bj is raised through
distortionary taxation from the citizenship as a hole. Taxes costs tax-
payers (1 + )Bj, where  is a parameter that measures the size of the
dead weight loss. When  = 0, resources are costlessly shifted from
taxpayers to the government, resulting in no welfare losses; when  > 0,
there is a welfare loss equivalent to Bj.
2.1.3 Social Welfare
The government maximizes a weighted average of the welfare of all mem-
bers of society, which include both civilians and enforcement o¢ cers.
The overall social welfare takes the form of
Wj =
Z 1
x^j
(x  h)g(x)dx  Bj (3)
This formulation di¤ers from the canonical approach in KS or Polin-
sky and Shavell (2001), and more similar in nature to setups more com-
monly found in the literature of corruption, such as in Besley and Mc-
Claren (1993) and La¤ont and Tirole (1993). This departure is justied
by the nature of the problem we are analyzing: it is precisely the cost of
ghting corruptionthat people talk about when discussing corruption.
In the next section, we construct the welfare functions for j = c; nc
under the assumption that self reporting is not possible. The government
can a¤ect the state j and the level of welfare Wj by changing its wage
policies w and i and by choosing the number of inspectors p8.
8The ne f is also a policy instrument that is optimally set by the government.
As in the rest of the enforcement literature, the ne is always maximal: f is set
to coincide with the wealth of the citizen. For a proof, Becker (1968), Kaplow and
Shavell (1994), Polinksy and Shavell (2001). There are some exceptions to this:
Malik (1990) shows that when criminals engage in detection avoidance, nes are not
maximal; however, Ines (2001) shows that when self reporting is introduced, there is
no need to engage in avoidance and therefore the Becker principle of maximal nes
applies again.
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2.2 No Self Reporting
2.2.1 Honest inspectors
Consider the choice faced by a citizen when the p inspectors are not
corrupted (because they are paid high incentives, i  inc). Since his
probability of being audited is p, by committing the act he expects to
pay a ne of pf ; this determines the threshold gain from the act, x^nc:
x^nc = pf
The threshold determines the number of unlawful acts, 1   G(x^nc),
and the expected payo¤received by the o¢ cer, which is the wage received
plus the incentive pay received if an o¤ender is found:
wEnc = w + i [1 G(pf)] (4)
Where E denotes the fact that this is the ex-ante payo¤, before audit
is conducted.
Next, consider the government budget. The government hires p in-
spectors, pays them an average of wEnc, and collects nes from citizens
who were caught. We assume that, while all every guilty audited person
pays the full ne f , it is only after some red tape and a lengthy bu-
reaucratic process; guilt must be assessed in front of a court of law, and
such time and resource consuming activities end up destroying part of
the ne income. At the end of the bureaucratic process, only f is left
of it to be used by the government9.
Accounting for wage expenses and ne income, the budget takes the
form
Bnc(p; w; i) = p

wEnc   f [1 G(pf)]

Where wEnc is dened by (4), and subject to the no-collusion bonus
pay (2). The budget is minimized when wEnc is minimized, that is, when
inspectors base pay is the reservation wage w and the no-collusion
constraint (2) binds. The objective function to be minimized is then
reduced to a function of p only:
Wnc(p) =
Z 1
pf
(x  h)g(x)dx  p fw + f(   )[1 G(pf)]g (5)
The three terms in the welfare function are the following: the rst
term is the welfare loss due to criminality; the second term is the base
pay w paid to the p o¢ cers; the last term is the net revenues to the
government, that is, ne income minus incentive pay.
9A modied version of costly imposition of nes is found in Polinsky and Shavell
(2000)
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2.2.2 Corrupted Inspectors
Consider the case in which incentives are too low, and there is scope for
bribe exchange. The potential law breakers choice is then to do nothing,
or commit the act and pay with probability p an expected bribe b as
dened by (1). The threshold condition is
x^c = min[pf; p[(1  )i+ f ]] (6)
In this scenario, the government pays only base wages to its inspec-
tors and receives no ne income, so the government budget is
Bc(p; w; i) = pw
Note that, in this case, incentives are o¤ered but never paid out.
However, they do play a role: they raise the equilibrium bribe and there-
fore increase the compliance threshold (6). In equilibrium, the govern-
ment increases i to the point where x^c = pf 10. The corrupted loss
function is then
Wc(p) =
Z 1
pf
(x  h)g(x)dx  pw (7)
2.2.3 When is corruption optimal?
The government can move from one equilibrium to the other by simply
modifying the incentive pay i. The nal outcome is determined by max-
imizing both Wnc and Wc in equations (5) and (7), and then choosing
whichever is larger. Both outcomes could happen in our model.
In this stylized model, the choice is dictated most directly by the
relative values of  and . In fact,   determines how much of the ne
collected by the honest o¢ cer ends up in the hands of the government (as
opposed to given out in incentive pay). When   , o¢ cers are e¢ cient
in the sense that they collect in nes more than they cost in incentive pay,
and it is never optimal to let these highly e¢ cient workers collect bribes
from law o¤enders. When  < , o¢ cers are ine¢ cient, in the sense
that each ne they collect is not su¢ cient to cover the expense to keep
them honest. It may not be optimal to keep these o¢ cers honest. It is
then possible that one o¢ cer corp keeps high standards of honesty, while
another does not, even within a nation which keeps di¤erent enforcement
agencies. Often, great e¤ort is exerted to keep highly protable corps
(tax administration, customs) as honest as possible, amid the widespread
corruption of other forces (police forces and anti-crime units).
10Strictly speaking, x^c must be as high as possible without ever reaching pf ; it
is pf   "; where " is an arbitrairly small positive number.
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The relative protability of the average o¢ cer is not the only aspect
taken into consideration when choosing the type of enforcement: cor-
rupted enforcement limits deterrence, and therefore it is less desirable.
However, when society is highly tolerant of corruption ( is high), over-
all bribe levels will remain high, and that in itself provides a relatively
large deterrence. Since deterrence is less of an issue in high- societies,
the expenditure motive will dominate the choice between corruption and
honesty.
An important point of the discussion so far is that in either regime
inspectors are paid above their reservation wage, in expectation. Their
base wage w can be supplemented by an extra bonus, or a bribe. Their
corruptibility allows them to capture some of the revenues accrued by
the state.
2.3 Allowing Self Reporting
We now introduce self reporting in both regimes, starting with j =
nc. Our treatment of self reporting follows Kaplow and Shavell: an
individual who committed the unlawful act may admit of it by reporting
his crime to the police; as a reward for the admission, the judiciary
imposes a reduced or discounted ne r, which is less than the ne f .
Furthermore, this citizen is exonerated from further examination, since
he cannot commit the crime twice. By self reporting and paying r, the
individual avoids paying either the ne f or a bribe b.
The reduced ne that is implemented follows a di¤erent judicial path
than the full ne. A citizen who is reported to the judiciary by a law
enforcer has the right to defend himself through the court of law, and
therefore demonstrating his culpability is at once time consuming and
expensive. The same cannot be said when a person reports his unlawful
act: by confessing, he gives up the right to demonstrate his innocence. As
a consequence, the bureaucratic procedure needed to process the reduced
ne is more e¢ cient and less expensive. For simplicity, we assume that
the government is able to appropriate all of the reduced ne collected.
2.3.1 Honest Inspectors
Suppose inspectors are honest. Then, an individual who commits an
unlawful act can either accept the chance of being reported and paying a
ne f , or reporting himself the act and pay the reduced ne r - whichever
is more convenient (less expensive) in expectation to him. An individual
with private gain x may commit the act if his private benet from the
act exceeds the cost:
x  min[r; pf ]  x^srnc
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When self reporting is allowed, the government adds r to the set
of policy instruments. To get the optimal level of r, consider rst the
case in which r > pf . Because self reporting is more expensive than
the expected full sanction, criminals do not report their act, and welfare
remains unchanged to Wnc in (5). In this case, self reporting is possible,
but no one employs it.
Now suppose r < pf . Now all unlawful acts are reported, and in-
dividuals pay only reduced nes to the government. Since x^srnc = r, the
total number of crimes committed is 1  G(r), and thus the fraction of
the population who does not report having committed the act is G(r);
this is also the fraction of the population that is subject to audits by
law enforcers. The welfare achieved is
W srnc(r; p; w; i) =
Z 1
r
(x h)g(x)dx pwsr;Enc G(r)  r[1 G(r)]	 (8)
Where wsr;Enc is again the expected wage paid per o¢ cer.
The rst result of the paper is encapsulated in the corollary that
follows the next proposition:
Proposition 1 When self reporting is adopted and corruption is not
allowed:
(i) r = pf (the reduced ne is equal to the expected full ne when
bribing is not possible);
(ii) i  f (the no-collusion condition (2) remains unchanged from
the case without self reporting);
(iii) wsr;Enc = w
 (average wages, including incentive pay, are equal to
the o¢ cersoutside option).
Proof. (i): Suppose r < pf . Then, the government could slightly de-
crease p without changing the inequality. Then, the integral in (8) would
not change, but the second term would decrease: welfare would go up.
Since r < pf is not optimal, it must be that r  pf . For the case of
r > pf , we have already shown that self reporting is not binding, and
therefore the proper welfare function that applies is still (5). Thus, the
only case in which self report binds is when r = pf .
Proof. (ii) suppose i < f . Then, if the o¢ cer confronts a person
who committed an unlawful act, she could accept a bribe b as denes
in equation (1) instead of reporting, since the bribe is larger than the
reward o¤ered by the state. Now consider the possible actions available
to a person who committed the act. If he chooses to report the act, he
pays a reduced ne r = pf: Otherwise, he can expect to pay a bribe
(1   )i + f < f < f . Hence, he prefers to pay the bribe instead of
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self reporting. In this case, corruption happens and o¢ cers are dishonest.
Therefore, to keep them honest the state needs to pay an incentive i  f:
Proof. (iii) So far, all criminal acts are reported to the government
directly from those responsible of committing them. Thus, inspectors only
inspect honest citizens, and therefore they earn no incentive pay: the only
salary paid is w  w. To maximize equation (8), the government sets
base wage as low as possible, to w.
With this proposition, we can replace r with pf , and wsr;Enc with
w: The welfare function to be maximized becomes
W srnc(p) =
Z 1
pf
(x  h)g(x)dx   fpwG(pf)  pf [1 G(pf)]g (9)
The rst term indicates the welfare loss due to crime; the second term
represents the wage bill w paid to the pG(pf) o¢ cers; the third term
is the revenues from self reporting. The main aspect of self reporting
that we want to highlight here is that self reporting as a policy is able
to separate honest citizens against citizens responsible for illegal actions
without the direct intervention of the police force, and is therefore able
to deprive the police of any information rents. We make a similar point
in a separate mechanism design working paper (Burlando and Motta
2007).
While the police do not intervene directly in the identication of
o¤enders, it does so indirectly, by providing a threat against those crim-
inals who fail to self report. Consider, for instance, the implementation
of parking violations. Cities allow drivers to park in certain areas only if
they pay a certain reduced ne at the curb. The only reason why people
pay that ne is because they know that the city employs parking inspec-
tors who randomly monitor cars and ne more heavily those that fail
to self report. Without the threat, people would not pay into parking
meters.
We now proceed by proving that the government always chooses to
implement a self reporting rule that is binding: r = pf:
Corollary 2 When inspectors are honest, it is better to have self report-
ing than not, i.e., r = pf . Self reporting is superior for three reasons: it
reduces the number of inspectors, it eliminates information rents, and it
eliminates bureaucratic costs.
To see why, it is su¢ cient to show that for any p that is chosen under
a policy that does not allow self reporting of behavior, the same level of
p yields greater social benet under a self reporting policy. Denote by
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~p the level of p that is chosen under the welfare function (5) when self
reporting is not possible. Suppose now that the government chooses to
implement self reporting, where ~r = ~pf . The change in welfare will be:
W srnc(~p) Wnc(~p) = ~p[1 G(~pf)] fw + (1  )f + fg > 0
Note that there are three components, premultiplied by a positive
number, and each component is greater than zero: without a doubt,
welfare increases with the adoption of the new policy. Note that the
increase is caused only by savings in enforcement expenditures, while
crime rates remain constant. ~p[1 G(~pf)] is the total number of o¢ cers
that were employed when there was no self reporting and who would
have caught an o¤ender. For each case that would have been prosecuted
without the aid of self reporting, the government saves in three ways:
rst, from the fact that the o¢ cers needed to identify the o¤enders were
not hired because they were not needed (the point made by Kaplow
and Shavell); second, from greater e¢ ciency in the process of o¤enders;
third, from incentives that are not paid out to inspectors any longer.
Note that the presence of each component does not depend on the
other two, because they are born out of di¤erent assumptions. If o¢ cers
were not able to target citizens who reported directly to the government
(say, because self reporting is unobservable), the rst source of savings
would be eliminated, but self reporting would still matter because it
eliminates rents and bureaucratic ine¢ ciencies. Similarly, our argument
works when self reporting does not yield bureaucratic e¢ ciencies, or
when o¢ cers are unable to earn rents (more on this last point in the
discussion section).
2.3.2 Corrupted inspectors
Suppose now that o¢ cers are corruptible: they may accept bribes from
individuals. In that case, the choice facing a guilty individual is between
self reporting rc and paying the bribe b, where b is still denes as equation
(1). The threshold level of gain needed to choose between committing
and not committing the act is
x^src = min[b; r]:
so that in order for self reporting to work, r  b. As before, if self
reporting binds (r = b), then the welfare achieved is
W src (rc; p; w; i) =
Z 1
rc
(x  h)g(x)dx  pwsr;Ec G(rc)  rc[1 G(rc)]	
(10)
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Where in this case, wsr;Ec is expected income from wages and expected
bribes, and rc[1 G(rc)] is income earned from self reporting nes. We
now establish a proposition that mirrors proposition 1 :
Proposition 3 When o¢ cers are corrupt, and self reporting is allowed:
(i) i = pf
(ii) rc = pf
(iii) wsr;Ec = w

Since the proof of this proposition is similar to the prior proof, we
leave in the appendix.
With this proposition, we are able to reduce the objective function
to a function which depends on p alone:
W src (p) =
Z 1
pf
(x h)g(x)dx  fpwG(pf)  pf [1 G(pf)]g (11)
Again, the rst term is the social loss due to criminality, and the term
in parenthesis is the wage paid minus the revenues from self reporting.
Corollary 4 When inspectors are dishonest, it is more e¢ cient to have
self-reporting than not.
Proof of corollary: For any ~p that is chosen under a policy without
self reporting, the government can introduce self reporting by choosing
rc = ~pf . The gain in welfare is given by the di¤erence between (11)
and (10):
W src (~p) Wc(~p) = ~p[1 G(~pf)] fw + fg > 0
Moving to a regime of self-reporting allows the government to save
from two sources. First, the government saves by employing fewer o¢ -
cers. Second, the government is able to earn the bribes that would have
been paid to its o¢ cers had they been in charge of uncovering o¤enders.
The principle established for the clean regime then translates also to the
corrupted regime: o¢ cers cannot earn rents under self reporting.
2.3.3 When is corruption optimal?
We have proved so far that self reporting should be employed in the
two states that we consider, namely, when o¢ cers are honest and when
they are not. We now establish the third result, which is that once self
reporting is introduced, it is always strictly better to eliminate bribe
exchanges. For a little intuition, consider a policy where rc = pf ,
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and incentives are not high enough to eliminate corruption. Suppose
now that the state raises incentives to a point where the no-collusion
constraint (2) is met. Without changing anything else, the trade o¤
faced by the individual is changed from paying bribes to paying full
nes. This change allows the government to re-optimize in a way that
increases welfare.
Proposition 5 For any pc chosen under a corrupt state with self re-
porting, there exists a policy pnc under a clean state with self reporting
that is strictly preferable.
Proof. Consider a regime of corruption with self reporting, where the
number of inspectors is ~p and the reduced ne is rc = ~pf . We now show
that the government would be strictly better o¤ if it were to eliminate
corruption (by choosing i  inc), reduce the workforce from ~p to p = ~p,
and keep the self reporting ne at rc. The change in welfare is then
W srnc(p) W src (~p) = ~p[1 G(~pf)] fw + fg > 0
The fact that corruption is never optimal should not come as a sur-
prise: the main reason for allowing corruption when there is no self re-
porting is that the government would forgo the expense of paying bonuses
to its o¢ cials; but under self-reporting, bonuses are never paid, and in
either regime inspectors earn their outside wage w only. With the main
benet of corruption gone, what is left is the negative aspect of cor-
ruption, namely, that it reduces deterrence. But the level of deterrence
under a corrupt regime can be achieved with lesser expense under a clean
one.
2.4 Summary of Results
We can summarize the theory in a simple diagram that shows the four
choices of the government, and the optimization problem embedded in
each choice:
No self reporting Self reporting
Uncorruptible o¢ cials
maxpWnc(p)
(1)
maxpW
sr
nc(pjr = pf)
(3)
Corruptible o¢ cials
maxpWc(p)
(2)
maxpW
sr
c (pjr = pf)
(4)
When self reporting is not allowed, the government may nd itself
either in a clean system (1) or corrupted system (2). However, self
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reporting cases (3) and (4) improve on (1) and on (2), and nally, if
self reporting is adopted, (3) is superior to (4). Corruption is thus fully
eliminated.
3 Discussion and Limits to the theory
3.1 Weakening of enforcement e¤ort
The rst limitation of self reporting in law enforcement is that it may
create moral hazard problems of its own among the o¢ cers. In our the-
ory, the probability of detection does not depend on the e¤ort exerted
by the o¢ cer. In reality, the intensity of e¤ort exerted is likely to change
the chance that an unlawful act is uncovered. If self reporting were to
eliminate unreported violations, then law enforcers would see no benet
in exerting e¤ort, and this would reduce the probability of detection for
everyone. How this weakening in enforcement impacts the overall equi-
librium and the implementation of self reporting depends on how e¤ort
is modeled. While this limitation may be substantial in some settings
where e¤ort strongly a¤ects enforcement, it may not be as important
in other settings where either e¤ort is unimportant or it can be easily
monitored by the enforcement agency. E¤ort may be unimportant when
the o¢ cer must perform many tasks, and only one of them is to check
whether an individual has committed the crime. For example, a cus-
toms o¢ cial at a port of entry performs a series of tasks on a random
selection of incoming containers, such as ensuring that contents match
the documentation. In the process, she may determine whether other
regulations have been violated without making signicant extra e¤ort:
whether all import duties have been paid, whether illegal substances or
restricted materials are found. In other instances, where e¤ort matters,
the government can monitor e¤ort. For example, many tasks can be
standardized and reduced to checklists or forms that must be completed
by the o¢ cers. Many instances of tax evasion are captured in this way,
since o¢ cers must rst of all check that forms sent from di¤erent sources
match the income report.
3.2 Adverse selection of o¢ cers
A second aspect worth considering is adverse selection among o¢ cers.
O¢ cers may have di¤erent degrees of ability in performing their job:
some may have a higher probability of uncovering o¤enders than others.
Clearly, self reporting eliminates these di¤erences, since the chance of
encountering an unreported violation is zero for both goodand bad
o¢ cials. This may be a problem for the enforcement agency if selection is
important in other aspects of its activities: for example, the agency may
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want to observe individual ability so that it can promote good workers
to higher ranks. In that case self reporting is still worth it if the agency
has other means to measure ability.
3.3 Failure to self report
In practice, it is often the case that agents fail to self report even when
such option is available and optimally designed. We can think of three
reasons for this. First, it may be that the probability of getting caught
is heterogeneous and varies from individual to individua (Innes 2000)11.
When this is the case, only high probability individuals choose to self
report. Second, a person may have more to hide than the crime itself: self
reporting on one crime may lead investigators to audit more thoroughly
other aspects of a persons life, the cost of which is not priced inthe self
reporting ne. Thus, a driver may prefer to hit and runa bystander
than stopping to help if he is carrying a stash of drugs with him, for which
he is liable to a harsh punishment. A related issue is the uncertainty
faced by the individual due to the complexity of the law. He cannot
be sure that, having self reported for one crime, the resulting scrutiny
would cause him to be held accountable for another act which he did
not think was illegal.
Whenever these circumstances arise in a way that cannot be priced
into the reduced ne12, some individuals will not self report, and there-
fore the government will not be able to avoid paying incentives to some
of its o¢ cers. This reduces the benet of self reporting, and increases
the benet of corruption.
3.4 Dynamic transions
Our model is an equilibrium model: we had shown no interest in how
people learn the equilibrium bribes, or the probabilities of detection.
But dynamics are important when the government is moving from an
equilibrium of corruption without self reporting to a clean self reporting
one. People take some time to believe that corruption is not a problem
any longer, and because of that they may not want to self report if they
think that they can pay a more advantageous bribe instead - even when
that option is no longer available.
The transition can be expensive, because it would require the pay-
ment of incentives to o¢ cials and may involve a self reporting ne that
11It is also possible that individuals actively engage in avoidance (Malik 1990, Innes
2001); however, unless individuals have di¤erent cost functions of avoidance, there is
no reason for agents to avoid self reporting.
12The pricing in can be accomplished only under the condition that all o¤enders
have homogeneous circumstances.
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is not initially binding. Because of this, the government would be worse
o¤ (otherwise they would not have had corruption to begin with). These
transition costs may be so high that they outweigh the future advantages
of self reporting, in which case there is no reason to ght corruption.
3.5 Unconstrained o¢ cers
So far we have assumed that inspectors are credit constrained and their
base pay cannot fall below their outside option. A consequence of this
action is that in expectation their wages exceed the outside option in
other words, they derive rents either from collusion, or from the preven-
tion of collusion.
We now consider the opposite extreme: suppose for instance that
the government can always adjust the base pay such that in expectation
inspectors are paid their outside option in either corrupt or not corrupt
regime:
wEnc=w + E(i) = w

wEc =w + E(b) = w

Inspectors are then willing to accept a base pay w that is lower than
their outside option, because they can make up the di¤erence with ei-
ther incentives or bribes. Because the wage can be adjusted downward,
corruption does not lead to rents to inspectors. Since the elimination of
rents to inspectors was a primary advantage of permits, permits are not
as useful here as they were in the base model. Nonetheless, they still
reduce bureaucratic costs through two channels. The rst is the reduc-
tion in the number of o¢ cers needed to monitor businesses. The other
is the elimination of red tape when nes are assessed through a court of
law. Because self reporting still have an advantage over the status quo,
the key nding of the paper  that a shift towards self reporting can
eliminate corruption remains unchanged13.
3.6 More complex anti-corruption policies
We have kept the policy space in our paper as simple as possible, in
order to reduce notational complexity (a problem that vexes to some
extent the literature on corruption). Our theory does not allow the
13In particular, it remains true that self reporting under no corruption strictly
dominates self reporting under corruption, and therefore self reporting can cleana
corrupt regime. We work out this model in a prior version of our paper, available
upon request.
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government to increase the probability of detecting bribe exchanges, nor
do we fully allow for nes from bribery14. Some other credible aspects of
law enforcement explored elsewhere, such as framing of innocent civilians
by law enforcers, should also be included in the theory of self reporting.
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